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Abstract  
Authentication is the first step toward establishing a service provider and customer (C-P) 
association. In a mobile network environment, a lightweight and secure authentication protocol is 
one of the most significant factors to enhance the degree of service persistence. This work 
presents a secure and lightweight keying and authentication protocol suite termed TAP (Time-
Assisted Authentication Protocol). TAP improves the security of protocols with the assistance of 
time-based encryption keys and scales down the authentication complexity by issuing a re-
authentication ticket. While moving across the network, a mobile customer node sends a re-
authentication ticket to establish new sessions with service-providing nodes. Consequently, this 
reduces the communication and computational complexity of the authentication process. In the 
keying protocol suite, a key distributor controls the key generation arguments and time factors, 
while other participants independently generate a keychain based on key generation arguments. 
We undertake a rigorous security analysis and prove the security strength of TAP using CSP and 
rank function analysis.  
Keywords: authentication, key distribution, network security, CSP, rank functions  
I. Introduction 
Newly emerging technologies such as IoT devices, smartphones with various sensors, wireless 
power charging systems, wearable devices, and smart sensors have brought forth different 
services with new types of service provider and customer (P-C) association requirements. For 
any service provider and customer (P-C) association, authentication is the first step. Typically, 
customers seek to obtain services from an authenticated service provider, and service providers 
are concerned about providing services to verified customers. However, to provide seamless 
service in a mobile environment, the service provider entity should be able to authenticate the 
mobile customer node with only a minimum delay time. This implies that the message exchange 
complexity of the authentication process should be low. A suitable authentication protocol for 
such an application should be lightweight and yet should ensure a proper protocol security level. 
Moreover, a secure authentication protocol certifies that the communicating entity is an 
authorized entity which is alive and participating in a protocol run according to a defined role. 
Further, the protocol run follows the correct pre-set sequence of a protocol run, and this should 
be achieved over insecure communication channels between the service provider and customer 
nodes [1-2]. 
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 Various authentication protocols have been designed to meet the requirements of different 
applications, including authentication for sensor networks [3], authentication for streaming data 
[4], authentication for IoT solutions [5], and authentication for ad-hoc networks [6]. The 
protocols developed thus far can be categories into the three primary categories of password-
based authentication [7-8], certificate-based authentication [9-10], and signature-based 
authentication protocols [11]. In this study, we introduce a novel, lightweight, and secure time-
assisted authentication protocol suite termed TAP [12]. The TAP protocol suite consists of 
keying and authentication protocol suites. The keying protocol suite consists of key agreement 
and key retrieval protocols. Likewise, the authentication protocol consists of the three protocols 
of the initial authentication protocol, re-authentication protocol 1, and re-authentication protocol 
2. The initial authentication protocol is a password-based authentication protocol, whereas the re-
authentication protocols are certificate-based authentication protocols where the certificate is a 
time-based ticket issued for a specified time duration.  
The well-known authentication protocol Kerberos [13] also employs a ticket for authentication, 
though in contrast with Kerberos, TAP does not require time synchronization. Moreover, in TAP 
the ticket verifier can authenticate the customer by itself without contacting the ticket-granting 
entity. Moreover, a stolen ticket in TAP is of no significance, while in the case of Kerberos, an 
unexpired stolen ticket is useful for an intruder. In an earlier study [14], the author analyzed the 
Kerberos protocol using CSP (communicating sequential processes) and a rank function analysis 
and established that the protocol is vulnerable to few known attacks, whereas our CSP and rank 
function analysis show that TAP is an entirely secure protocol. To ensure secure authentication, 
TAP employs a distributed keychain generation mechanism and reverses the time-based usage of 
the keychain. Unlike TESLA [15], in TAP the keychain is independently generated by multiple 
devices and is also used by each device to drive other encryption keys. For instance, during an 
interval 𝑖  when a customer node wants to obtain service, it acquires an authentication ticket 
encrypted with the 𝑖𝑡ℎ key, and once it moves across the network, the verifier can verify the 
ticket by decrypting the ticket using the 𝑖𝑡ℎ key. The key distribution and time-based usage of 
the keychain are controlled by the main authentication entity (ME), which can be an independent 
authentication server or an agent installed on a server. While moving across the network, a 
mobile customer experiences the authentication process multiple times. With authentication 
ticket, the overall computational and message exchange complexity of the authentication process 
is reduced significantly. 
To establish the overall infrastructure for service and authentication, each main authentication 
entity (ME) creates a group of service provider entities and neighboring main authentication 
entities (ME). Using group key encryption, the main authentication entity (ME) broadcasts the 
time-based key generation parameters to all group members. In earlier work [16], the author 
presented and examined several group key management protocols. In this discussion, we assume 
that the main authentication entity (ME) has knowledge of the public keys of all group members; 
hence, it can share a group key with new group members using public-private key semantics. To 
determine the security strength of TAP, we considered an intruder as discussed in earlier work 
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[17] with certain extra capabilities. For instance, the intruder is capable of operating on all 
communication channels between the customer and service provider entity. Moreover, the 
intruder can redirect, spoof, replay or block messages, and has initially known information; e.g., 
it knows the IDs of all users and service provider entities. It can intercept, record, and generate a 
message from known information. Given the presence of such an intruder, we discuss the 
strength of TAP against some known attacks and instances of intercepted credentials, such as 
impersonation of a customer node, impersonation of a service provider entity, and a replay 
attack. We further analyze TAP using CSP and rank function analysis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II gives a brief system overview and 
discusses the proposed strategy in particular. In Section III, we review the strength of TAP 
against several known attacks and cases of intercepted credentials. Next, the formal analysis of 
TAP using CSP and rank function analysis is presented in Section IV. Then, in Section V, we 
compare the security and performance of the TAP protocol suite with those of previous methods 
work in the literature. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in Section VI. 
II. Analytical Model and Proposed Scheme  
The TAP system is not limited to a particular network type or application; it is suitable for sensor 
networks, mobile networks, and client-server applications, among others. For the discussion and 
analysis, we consider that the TAP system consists of the three major entities of the main 
authentication entity (𝑀𝐸), the service provider entity (𝑃), and the customer node (𝐶). The main 
authentication entity (𝑴𝑬) knows the public keys of all service provider entities (𝑃) and 
customer nodes (𝐶). It authenticates and issues a time-based ticket (𝑇𝑘) for re-authentication. It 
also authenticates any newly joining service provider entity ( 𝑃 ). During the authentication 
process of 𝑃 , the 𝑀𝐸  sends the customer node’s requirement profile for an efficient and 
optimized P ↔ C relationship. In addition, the 𝑀𝐸  controls the key distribution and derives 
various keys from the keychain. All MEs are connected via secure links and share public keys 
with all of their neighbors. The service provider entity (𝑷) authenticates 𝐶 upon receiving a 
valid authentication ticket (𝑇𝑘) and starts providing services based upon the user profile. Upon 
the receipt of the initial authentication request, 𝑃  forwards the message to 𝑀𝐸.  In some 
applications, 𝑃  has two separate areas of operation: the service-delivery area ( 𝐴𝑠)  and the 
communication area (𝐴𝑐). 𝑃 may authenticate or forward a request to 𝑀𝐸 while 𝐶 is in 𝐴𝑠,  and it 
may provide services once it enters 𝐴𝑐. The customer node (𝑪) can join or leave the system 
dynamically and can move across the network. Either 𝐶 joins the network or switches from one 
service provider (𝑃) to another. In both cases, 𝐶 is responsible for initiating the authentication 
procedure. 
 
Notations: 
• 𝑀𝐸𝑗 = The 𝑗𝑡ℎ main authentication entity. 
• 𝑃𝑗= The 𝑗𝑡ℎ  service provider entity. 
• 𝐶𝑖= The 𝑖𝑡ℎ customer node. 
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• 𝐴∆𝐵 = A is associated with B such that B is in controlling authority.  
– 𝑃𝑖∆𝑀𝐸𝑖 represents that 𝑖𝑡ℎ service provider entity  is associated with 𝑗𝑡ℎ ME. 
• 𝐺𝑗  =Group of all associated entities of 𝑗𝑡ℎ ME. 
• 𝐺𝑗
𝑜= Group of all non-associated entities of 𝑗𝑡ℎ ME  who knows the 𝐾𝐺
𝑗
. 
• 𝐾0
𝑗
=The time-based key generated at 0𝑡ℎ interval  known as commitment key. 
• 𝐾𝑖
𝑗
=The time-based key generated at 𝑖𝑡ℎ interval by 𝑀𝐸𝑗 . 
• 𝐾𝐶
𝑗
= The secret public key of 𝑗𝑡ℎ Customer, it is publically known to the 𝑀𝐸s only.    
• 𝐾𝑀𝐸
𝑗
  is the public key of 𝑀𝐸𝑗 , 𝐾𝑃
𝑗
  is the public key of 𝑃𝑗 and 𝐾𝐶
𝑗
  is the public key of 𝐶𝑗. 
• 𝐾𝐺
𝑗
=A group key generated by 𝑀𝐸𝑗. 
• 𝐾𝑆
𝑖= A C→P session key generated at 𝑖𝑡ℎ interval. 
• 𝐾𝑘
𝑝
= A partial key of 𝐶𝑘 used to generate 𝐶 → 𝐶 session key. 
• 𝐾𝑖,𝑗= A C→C session key generated from partial keys. 
• 𝐸𝐵
𝑖 (𝑚)=Encrypting message ‘m’ with key 𝐾𝐵
𝑖  .  
• 𝐸𝑀𝐸
𝑗
 (𝑚) represents the  encryption of ‘m' using 𝐾𝑀𝐸
𝑗
. 
• 𝑉0=The index value for interval 0. 
• 𝑇𝑘= The 𝑘𝑡ℎ  Ticket generated at 𝑖𝑡ℎ  interval. 
• 𝑍(𝐴) = An intruder 𝑍 impersonating entity 𝐴. 
• 𝑁𝑖= 𝑖𝑡ℎ nonce in a TAP message exchange. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. System architecture  
 
The overall system architecture is shown in Figure 1. Each 𝑀𝐸 creates a group which consists of 
neighbor 𝑀𝐸s and associated service provider entities. The 𝑀𝐸 shares a symmetric group key 
𝐾𝐺
𝑗
 with all group members. For instance, in Figure 1 𝑀𝐸2 creates a group consisting of 𝑀𝐸1, 
𝑀𝐸3,  and associated service providers (𝑃1 … 𝑃𝑘) . The group formation and group key 𝐾𝐺
𝑗
 
management processes can be done as per system constraints and requirements. In this 
discussion, we assume that 𝑀𝐸𝑗 knows the public keys of all group members; consequently, it 
can share group key 𝐾𝐺
𝑗
 with new group members using public-private key encryption. The 
group key is a rational choice given the assumption that group members are not synchronized 
with regard to time. In a stable synchronized distributed system, the group key  𝐾𝐺
𝑗
 can be 
replaced by the time-based key 𝐾𝑖
𝑗
, where 𝐾𝑖
𝑗
 should be the final key in the keychain. The TAP 
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scheme consists of two protocol suites, the keying protocol suite and the authentication protocol 
suite, which are discussed below in subsections A and B, respectively 
 
B. Keying Protocol: 
 As in TESLA [15], TAP also generates a keychain using an irreversible function. However, in 
TESLA keys are used to authenticate a broadcasting entity; in TAP the keys are used to derive 
several other keys, such as a ticket encryption key, a C↔P session key, and partial session key 
generators which provide security to the authentication system overall. Moreover, in TESLA 
[15], the keychain is generated in the broadcasting entity, whereas in TAP all members of 𝐺𝑗 
generate and share the same “chain of key generators” of length 𝐿. The group leader (𝑀𝐸𝑗 ) 
shares the key generation information (𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑀𝑆𝐺) with group members when they join the group. 
After the expiration of 𝑇𝑑 (at a valid time for commitment key)  𝑀𝐸𝑗  broadcast 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑀𝑆𝐺  to all 
members of 𝐺𝑗; 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑀𝑆𝐺   is encrypted with 𝐾𝐺
𝑗
 or in the case of a time-synchronized system is 
encrypted with 𝐾𝑙
𝑗
(the final key in the keychain). The key generation information (𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑀𝑆𝐺) is 
used to generate a commitment key (𝐾0
𝑗
); afterward, all group members independently generate 
the “chain of key generators.” The group leader 𝑀𝐸𝑗  controls the procedure of commitment key 
generation and all related characteristics.  
The key generation information 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑀𝑆𝐺 = 𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑢𝑝(𝐼, 𝑂) ||𝑇𝑑 ||𝑇𝑐
𝑗||𝑁0
𝑗
 ||𝐿 ||𝑀𝑂𝐷𝐸  consists of 
several pieces of information. 𝐼 and 𝑂 are index and offset values, respectively, which are used to 
select a predefined value from the secret 𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸. 𝑇𝑑 is the valid time duration for commitment 
key 𝐾0
𝑗 , 𝑇𝐶 is the time on 𝑀𝐸𝑗 when it was broadcasting 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑀𝑆𝐺 , 𝑁𝑜
𝑗
 is a nonce and 𝑀𝑂𝐷𝐸  is 
the key retrieval mode (discussed in subsection b). Note that  𝑇𝑑 is divided into 𝐿 number of 
intervals; it also determines the keychain length.  
a) Key Generation and Distribution: 
The time frame shown in Figure 3-(a) is composed of three periods: the time required for key 
generation  ( 𝑇𝐺 ), the time needed for key distribution ( 𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑠 ), and the valid time for the 
commitment key (𝑇𝑑). All 𝐺𝑖 members follow the subsequent steps: (1) run a function 𝑔 (shown 
in Figure 3-(b)) to generate the commitment key generator 𝐺0
𝑗 = 𝑔(𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑢𝑝(𝐼, 𝑂), 𝑇𝑑 ,  𝑁0
𝑗). (2) 
An irreversible function 𝐹 takes 𝐺0
𝑗  as input argument and generates a “chain of key generators” 
of length  𝐿,   {𝐹(𝐺0
𝑗) = 𝐺1
𝑗 ,  𝐹(𝐺1
𝑗) = 𝐺2
𝑗 … … 𝐹(𝐺𝑙−1
𝑗 ) = 𝐺𝑙
𝑗
;  i-e 𝐹(𝐺𝑘
𝑗)
𝑖
= 𝐺𝑘+𝑖
𝑗
. (3) Using 
another irreversible function 𝑓 (shown in Figure 3(c)) all members of 𝐺𝑗  generate an index value 
and keychain, 𝑓(𝐺0
𝑗) = (𝐾0
𝑗||𝑉0), 𝑓(𝐺1
𝑗) = (𝐾1
𝑗||𝑉1) … 𝑓(𝐺𝑙
𝑗) = (𝐾𝑙
𝑗||𝑉𝑙) → 𝑉||𝐾 ; where, 
𝑉 = {𝑉0,  𝑉1, … . 𝑉𝑙}  and  𝐾 = {𝐾0
𝑗 , 𝐾1
𝑗 , ..  𝐾𝑙
𝑗
}. These keys are used for ticket encryption; for 
instance, the 𝑖𝑡ℎ key (𝐾𝑖
𝑗
) is used to encrypt tickets (𝑇𝑘) issued during the 𝑖𝑡ℎ time interval. Keys 
are disclosed in reverse order such the intruder cannot generate future keys, whereas the indexing 
vector (𝑉) serves in an indexing role to retrieve the ticket encryption key. For instance, if 𝑉𝑖 
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corresponds to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  interval, the key is retrieved as 𝐹(𝐺0
𝑗)
𝑖
= 𝐺𝑖
𝑗 ⇒ 𝑓(𝐺𝑖
𝑗) = (𝐾𝑖
𝑗 ,  𝑉𝑖) . 
(4) 𝑀𝐸𝑗  broadcasts 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑀𝑆𝐺for the next chain to all group members using 𝐾𝐺
𝑗  or  𝐾𝑙
𝑖. Steps 1-3 
are performed in 𝑇𝐺  and step 4 is executed during 𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑠. In addition to the time-based keys (for 
ticket encryption), 𝑀𝐸𝑗  also generates a unique C↔P session key 𝐾𝑆
𝑖 = 𝐻(𝐾𝑖
𝑗||𝐻(𝐾𝐶
𝑘))  for 
verified 𝐶𝑘 and 𝑃𝑗. Moreover, the validity time for  𝐾𝑆
𝑘 is given as 𝑇𝑅 = 𝑙𝑖 − 𝐿. 
 
Figure 2. Time-based keys generation and admission with reference to time passage. 
 
 
Figure 3. (a) Time frame. (b) Structure of function g ⟹ 𝐻(𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑢𝑝(𝐼, 𝑂)⨁𝑇𝑑 ⨁ 𝑁0
𝑗 
) . (c) 
Structure of function f ⟹ 𝐻(𝐺𝑖
𝑗)⨁𝑁0
𝑗 
||𝐻(𝑖) ⨁ 𝑁0
𝑗 
).  
b) The Retrieval Modes For The Ticket Encryption Key: 
 The authentication ticket consists of two segments: the customer information segment and the 
key retrieval information segment respectively encrypted with the time-based key 𝐾𝑙
𝑖 and group 
key 𝐾𝐺
𝑗
. The key retrieval procedure depends on the structure of the ticket, which is determined 
by the system requirements and constraints. We propose three different key retrieval modes, as 
presented below. 
𝐸𝑖
𝑗(𝐶𝑘 ||𝐾𝑠
𝑖||𝑉𝑖 ||𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒 ||𝐻ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑) ||𝐸𝐺
𝑗(𝐶𝑘||𝑉𝑖 ||𝐻(𝐺𝑖)||𝐻(𝐾𝐶
𝑘)) ∴ Mode-1 
𝐸𝑖
𝑗(𝐶𝑘||𝐾𝑠
𝑖||𝑉𝑖 ||𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒 ||𝐻ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑) ||𝐸𝐺
𝑗
 (𝐶𝑘||(𝑇𝑡) ||𝐻(𝐺𝑖)||𝐻(𝐾𝐶
𝑘)) ∴  Mode-2 
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𝐸𝑖
𝑗(𝐶𝑘||𝐾𝑠
𝑖||𝑉𝑖 ||𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒 ||𝐻ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑) ||𝐸𝐺
𝑗(𝐶𝑘||𝑉𝑖||𝐻ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 ||𝑉𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ||𝐻(𝐾𝐶
𝑘)) ∴  Mode-3 
The second half of 𝑇𝑘 depends on the mode and consists of time-based key retrieval information; 
once the time-based key is retrieved, it is then employed to decrypt and verify the first half of 𝑇𝑘. 
In mode-01, 𝑀𝐸𝑗  adds the index value (𝑉𝑖) in the key retrieval information segment. The ticket 
verifier compares the appended value within the locally generated vector (𝑉). A match at the 
𝑖𝑡ℎ place indicates that the ticket is generated by 𝑀𝐸𝑗  at the 𝑖𝑡ℎ interval and can be decrypted by 
key 𝐾𝑖
𝑗
. In mode-02, 𝑀𝐸𝑗  inserts the ticket issuing time 𝑇𝑡  into the key retrieval information 
segment. The verifiers can search for the value of the index within the following range:  
[|𝑇𝑐
𝑖 − 𝑇𝑡| ∗
𝑇𝑑
𝐿
− 𝜖𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 , |𝑇𝑐
𝑖 − 𝑇𝑡| ∗
𝑇𝑑
𝐿
+ 𝜖𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ]  
Where, 𝑇𝑐
𝑖 is the current time of the verifier clock and  𝜖 is the time drift. Initially, the value of 𝜖 
is calculated as 𝜖0 = |𝑇𝑐
𝑖 − 𝑇𝑐
𝑗| .  
Upon each successful retrieval of 𝐾𝑘
𝑗
, the value of 𝜖 is updated as shown below. 
𝜖𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝑤0 ∗ 𝜖𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 + 𝑤1 ∗ 𝜖𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡   
In this equation, 𝑤0 = 1 −
𝑇𝑐
𝑖+𝑇𝑡
𝑇𝑑
  and 𝑤1 =
𝑇𝑐
𝑖+𝑇𝑡
𝑇𝑑
 
In mode-03, all 𝐺𝑖 members independently generate a binary hash tree whose leaf nodes are 
‘indexing values’ taken from index vector (𝑉). 𝑀𝐸𝑗  adds the index value (𝑉𝑖)  and log2|𝑉| 
number of hash values in key retrieval information segment; these hash values are selected nodes 
of the hash tree. Likewise, the verifier can reconstruct the hash tree with the total log2|𝑉| 
number of hash operations, which gives the complexity of 𝑂(𝑙𝑜𝑔). After the reconstruction of 
the tree and confirmation of the head node, the verifier retrieves the index value by running the 
following simple search algorithm. Owing to the appended hash values, the index search 
complexity is reduced to O (1). 
Search algorithm: 
 Start from head node and go down  
 Ignore the appended values and follow reconstructed node. 
 Do until level  log2|𝑉| − 1 
 Now, finally select the appended value which is the index value 
The mode 3 is suitable if the keychain is very long.  
C. Authentication Protocol Suite: 
A customer node 𝐶𝑖 is authenticated in three different ways. When it joins the system, it goes 
through a password-based authentication procedure termed the initial authentication protocol. 
Hereafter, when 𝐶𝑖  moves across the network, it is re-authenticated by a certificate-based 
authentication procedure known as a re-authentication protocol, where a certificate is a time-
based ticket issued by 𝑀𝐸𝑗  during the initial authentication protocol run. 
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a) Initial Authentication Protocol: 
After every 𝑖𝑡ℎ interval, 𝑃𝑗  broadcasts  𝑀𝐸𝑗 ’s public key. A newly joining  𝐶𝑖  may receive 
multiple broadcast messages; however, 𝐶𝑖  continues with the first  𝑃𝑗, and the protocol proceeds 
as follows: 
 
Figure 4.  Message exchange for the initial authentication protocol. 
M1. 𝑃𝑗 broadcast 𝑀𝐸𝑗’s public key. 
M2. In the joining request 𝐶𝑖 sends 𝑁0 encrypted with 𝑀𝐸𝑗’s public key to 𝑃𝑗. If 𝐶𝑖 is 
already registered with 𝑀𝐸𝑗, the nonce  𝑁0 can be replaced with the hash value of the 
password.  
M3. 𝑃𝑗  forwards the request to 𝑀𝐸𝑗 . 𝑀𝐸𝑗  retrieves the profile from the database; 
if 𝐶𝑖 is authorized for the requested services, 𝑀𝐸𝑗   retrieves 𝐶𝑖 's secret key and sends the 
message M4. 
M4. 𝑀𝐸𝑗 sends M4 to 𝑃𝑗 composed of ticket 𝑇𝑘, the index value, and 𝑁1 (challenge for 
𝐶𝑖 ) all encrypted with 𝐾𝐺
𝑗
 intended for 𝑃𝑗  and 𝑢0 = 𝐸𝐶
𝑖 (𝑃𝑗||𝑁0 + 1 ||𝑁1 ||𝑇𝑘 ||𝑇𝑅||𝐾𝑠
𝑖) 
intended for 𝐶𝑖. 𝑃𝑗 retrieves the customer profile and session key 𝐾𝑠
𝑖 from the ticket 𝑇𝑘. 
M5. 𝑃𝑗 forwards 𝑢0 to 𝐶𝑖. After challenge verification, 𝐶𝑖  accepts 𝑇𝑘. 
a. 𝑃𝑗 → 𝐶𝑖: 𝑢0||𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∴  if the service provider entity cannot fulfill the service 
requested due to resource limitations, it sends a message 'Limited'. 𝐶𝑖  may 
continue or connect to another service provider entity with the allotted ticket. 
M6. After challenge confirmation, 𝑃𝑗  starts providing services; otherwise, 𝑃𝑗  halts the 
service and announces  𝑇𝑘 as an invalid ticket.  
b) Re-Authentication Protocol-1: 
When an authenticated 𝐶𝑖 moves from 𝑃𝑘 → 𝑃𝑗 such that {𝑃𝑘,  𝑃𝑗} ∈ 𝐺𝑖, the protocol proceeds as 
follows. 
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Figure 5. Message exchange for re-authentication protocol-1. 
M1. 𝐶𝑖 sends  𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑞 = 𝐸𝑆
𝑖(𝐶𝑖 ||𝑁0)||𝑇𝑘 ||ℎ(𝑀𝐸𝑖)  to  𝑃𝑗 . 𝑃𝑗  decrypts the ticket, 
retrieves the customer profile, and confirms whether  𝐶𝑖  is authorized for the 
further service. 
a. Note that if 𝑃𝑗  receives multiple identical 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑞  messages from 𝐶𝑖 , it 
indicates the existence of a malicious user. 
M2. 𝑃𝑗  sends a challenge response along with a new challenge for 𝐶𝑖 encrypted with the 
C↔P session key. 
M3. After challenge confirmation, 𝑃𝑗  starts providing services; otherwise, 𝑃𝑗   halts the 
service and announces  𝑇𝑘 as an invalid ticket. 
c) Re-Authentication Protocol-2: 
When an authenticated 𝐶𝑖 moves from 𝑃𝑘 → 𝑃𝑗  such that 𝑃𝑗 ∈ 𝐺𝑘
𝑜 , the protocol proceeds as 
follows. 
 
 
Figure 6. Message exchange for re- authentication protocol-2. 
M1. 𝐶𝑖 sends 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑞 = 𝐸𝑆
𝑖(𝐶𝑖 ||𝑁0)||𝑇𝑘 ||ℎ(𝑀𝐸𝑖) to 𝑃𝑗.  The 𝑃𝑗 decrypts the second half 
of 𝑇𝑘; if the request is not from 𝐶𝑖, then 𝑃𝑗  discards the request; otherwise, 𝑃𝑗 forwards it 
to 𝑀𝐸𝑗 . 
M2. 𝑀𝐸𝑗  decrypts the ticket, retrieves the customer profile, and 
confirms whether  𝐶𝑖  is authorized for the further service. If 𝐶𝑖  is eligible for further 
services,  𝑀𝐸𝑗  generates 𝐾𝑠
𝑖 = ℎ(𝐾𝑐
𝑖||𝑉𝑖) and proceeds as described below. Otherwise, 
𝑀𝐸𝑗  ignores the request and C𝑖  may initiate the initial authentication protocol. If 𝐶𝑖 sends 
multiple M1 messages, 𝑃𝑗  ignores the messages, and 𝐶𝑖 is marked as a malicious user.  
M3. 𝑀𝐸𝑗  sends M3 to 𝑃𝑗 composed of new ticket 𝑇𝑘, the index value 𝑉𝑖, and 𝑁1 (challenge 
for 𝐶𝑖 ) encrypted with 𝐾𝐺
𝑗
 intended for 𝑃𝑗  and  𝑢0
𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝐸𝐶
𝑖 (𝑇𝑘 ||𝑇𝑅 ||𝐾𝑠
𝑖 ||𝑁1 ||𝑁0 +
1 ||𝑃𝑗)  intended for 𝐶𝑖 .  𝑃𝑗  retrieves the customer profile and session key 𝐾𝑠
𝑖 from the 
new ticket 𝑇𝑘. 
M4. 𝑃𝑗 forwards 𝑢0 to 𝐶𝑖. After challenge verification, 𝐶𝑖  accepts the 𝑇𝑘.  
M5. After challenge confirmation, 𝑃𝑗  starts providing services; otherwise, 𝑃𝑗   halts the 
service and announces  𝑇𝑘 as an invalid ticket. 
If 𝐶𝑖 ∉ 𝐺𝑘
𝑜 ∪ 𝐺𝑘,the 𝑃𝑗  ignores the request, and 𝐶𝑖 initiates the initial authentication protocol. 
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d) Special Cases: 
Customer-Customer (𝑪𝒊 ↔ 𝑪𝒋) Mutual Authentication: 
Here, we assume that two customer nodes ( 𝐶𝑗  and  𝐶𝑖 ) want to communicate directly. To 
authenticate each other, 𝐶𝑗  and 𝐶𝑖 exchange messages composed of respective tickets and partial 
keys which are encrypted with the respective C↔P session keys. 
 𝐶𝑖 → 𝐶𝑗: 𝐸𝑠
𝑖(𝐶𝑖||𝑁0 ||𝐾𝑖
𝑝)||𝑇𝑘 . 
 𝐶𝑗 → 𝐶𝑖: 𝐸𝑠
𝑗(𝐶𝑗||𝑁0 + 1 ||𝑁1 ||𝐾𝑗
𝑝)||𝑇𝑘. 
To decrypt the authentication message, both 𝐶𝑖 and  𝐶𝑗  forward it to their associated service 
provider entities. After the first message exchange, there are three possible scenarios concerning 
the C ↔ P association. The customer-customer mutual authentication protocol proceeds 
differently for each scenario, as discussed below. 
1- If {𝐶𝑖 ,  𝐶𝑗}∆𝑃𝑗  , the respective service provider entity (𝑃𝑗 ) decrypts the messages and 
retrieves the partial keys for associated customers; 𝑃𝑗 sends the partial key along with a 
challenge response to 𝐶𝑗  and 𝐶𝑖 . After challenge verification, both 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐶𝑗  generate a 
C↔C session key 𝐾𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐻(𝐾𝑖
𝑝 ⨁ 𝑁1 ||𝐾𝑗
𝑝 ⨁ 𝑁0) for further communication.  
2- If {𝑃𝑖 ,  𝑃𝑗} ∈ 𝐺𝑗  and 𝐶𝑖∆𝑃𝑖 and 𝐶𝑗∆𝑃𝑗, the respective service provider entities decrypt the 
message and retrieve the partial key for associated customers. 𝑃𝑗 and 𝑃𝑖 send the partial 
key along with a challenge response to 𝐶𝑗 and  𝐶𝑖 , respectively. After the challenge 
verification step, both 𝐶𝑖 and  𝐶𝑗  generate a C↔C session key 
𝐾𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐻(𝐾𝑖
𝑝 ⨁ 𝑁1 ||𝐾𝑗
𝑝 ⨁ 𝑁0) for further communication. 
3- If {𝑃𝑖 ,  𝑃𝑗} ∈ 𝐺𝑗
0, 𝐶𝑖∆𝑃𝑖, and 𝐶𝑗∆𝑃𝑗, the individual service providers forward the message 
to the respective 𝑀𝐸s to retrieve the partial keys. After receiving the response from the 
respective 𝑀𝐸 s, 𝑃𝑗  and 𝑃𝑖  send the partial key along with a challenge response to 
𝐶𝑗  and  𝐶𝑖 , respectively. After challenge verification, both 𝐶𝑖  and  𝐶𝑗  generate a C↔C 
session key  𝐾𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐻(𝐾𝑖
𝑝 ⨁ 𝑁1 ||𝐾𝑗
𝑝 ⨁ 𝑁0) for further communication.  
Delayed or lost response for a joining/switch request:   
As discussed earlier, multiple identical joining/switch requests from the same 𝑪𝒊 indicate the 
existence of an intruder. The inclusion of the previous nonce prevents the situation of 
misinterpretation between a lost request and a replay attack. 
a. 𝐶𝑖 → 𝑃𝑗: 𝐸𝑀𝐸
𝑗
 (𝐶𝑖||𝑁0||𝑁0
′). 
b. 𝐶𝑖 → 𝑃𝑗: 𝐸𝑠
𝑖(𝐶𝑖||𝑁0||𝑁0
′)||𝑇𝑘 ||𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑞. 
For re-authentication protocol-2, if 𝑪𝒊 does not obtain a response for a switch request, it indicates 
that an intruder has forged 𝒉(𝑴𝑬𝒊), and  𝑷𝒋 is unable to proceed. Hence, 𝑷𝒋 ignores the request 
and 𝑪𝒊 sends an initial authentication request along with nonce sent in the previous request. The 
inclusion of the previous nonce prevents the situation of misunderstanding between a lost request 
and a replay attack..  
a. 𝐶𝑖 → 𝑃𝑗: 𝐸𝑀𝐸
𝑗 (𝐶𝑖||𝑁0 ||𝑁0
′  || 𝑇𝑘 ||𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡) . 
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III. Strength against several known attacks 
To verify the security of TAP, we introduce an intruder 𝑍  into the system, as discussed in earlier 
work [17]. The intruder is capable of controlling all communication channels (send and receive); 
it can redirect, spoof, replay or block messages and has initially known information, such as the 
IDs of all users. In the presence of such an intruder, we explore the strength of TAP against 
certain known attacks, in this case the replay, parallel session, and binding attacks.  
A. Impersonating  𝑪𝒊 
Let us consider an intruder  𝑍(𝐶𝑖) who intercepts and records the messages from 𝐶𝑖 and can 
communicate with 𝑃𝑗. During the initial authentication process, if 𝑍(𝐶𝑖) impersonates 𝐶𝑖 without 
intercepting original messages from 𝐶𝑖, at M3 the presence of the intruder is detected, as 𝑀𝐸𝑗  
receives multiple join requests from the same 𝐶𝑖 such that the requests come from multiple or 
single instances of 𝑃𝑗  with multiple requests per 𝑃𝑗, thus indicating the presence of an intruder. In 
the given scenario, 𝑀𝐸𝑗  sends an alert message appended with M4; additionally, each M4 
includes a different 𝑁1 challenge nonce for each request forwarding 𝑃𝑗 
( 𝑀𝐸𝑗 → 𝑃𝑗  : 𝑢0 ||𝐸𝐺
𝑗(𝑉𝑖 ||𝑁1  ||𝑇𝑘)||𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡 ). Similarly, even if 𝑍(𝐶𝑖) impersonates and 
successfully intercepts all messages from 𝐶𝑖, it still fails to send M6 without knowing the C↔P 
session key and the private key of 𝐶𝑖.  In re-authentication protocol-1 and protocol-2, if 
𝑍(𝐶𝑖) impersonates and successfully intercepts all the messages from 𝐶𝑖, without knowing the 
C↔P session key, 𝑍(𝐶𝑖) fails to send a valid M3 in protocol-1 and an authentic M5 in protocol-
2. The failure of M3/M5 indicates the presence of a malicious user. Likewise, in mutual 
authentication protocol for customers, an intruder cannot acquire partial keys without knowing 
the  C ↔ P session keys. 
 
B. Impersonating  𝑷𝒊 
Let us consider an intruder 𝑍(𝑃𝑖) who can intercept and record messages from 𝑃𝑗  and can 
communicate with 𝐶𝑖. If 𝑍(𝑃𝑗) impersonates 𝑃𝑗 and successfully intercepts all messages from 𝑃𝑗 , 
it brings a minor delay, and  𝐶𝑖  initiates another authentication process. Moreover, 𝑍(𝑃𝑗)  is 
unable to obtain 𝑇𝑘 without knowing the private key of 𝐶𝑖 and cannot obtain 𝐾𝐺
𝑗
 without knowing 
the private key of 𝑃𝑗 .  Similarly, in re-authentication protocol-1 and protocol-2, if 
𝑍(𝑃𝑗) impersonates and successfully intercepts all messages from 𝑃𝑗 , 𝑍(𝑃𝑗) is still unable to 
obtain 𝑇𝑘 without knowing the C↔P session key.  
C. Replay or Multiplicity Attack 
To investigate the strength of TAP against a replay or multiplicity attack, as introduce the 
intruder 𝑍(𝐶𝑖) , as discussed above, and launch a replay attack against initial and re-
authentication protocols. 
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a) Replay attack on the Initial Authentication Protocol 
In the {Z(𝐶𝑖),  𝐶𝑖}∆𝑀𝐸𝑗  case, the intruder 𝑍(𝐶𝑖)  can replay a few messages in the initial 
authentication protocol run; however, it fails to complete the protocol run, and the presence of 
the intruder is detected after few messages are exchanged. 
 
Figure 7. An example of replay attack on TAP initial authentication protocol. 
 𝑀2′: Intruder 𝑍(𝐶𝑖) intercepts M2 and replays the message towards  𝑃𝑗
′ . 
 𝑀3′: 𝑀𝐸𝑗  receives similar multiple join requests from 𝑃𝑗 and 𝑃𝑗
′, which is a conceivable 
indication of a malicious user. 
 𝑀𝐸𝑗 will send 𝑀4 and 𝑀4
′ to 𝑃𝑗  and 𝑃𝑗
′, respectively. Both messages consist of an alert 
signal and two different challenges. 
 𝑀6′: The intruder fails to complete the attack, as the expected reply is 𝐸𝑠
𝑖(𝐶𝑖||𝑁1
′ + 1), 
and 𝑃𝑗
′  notifies 𝑀𝐸𝑗 of the existence of an intruder. 
 
b) Replay attack on Re-Authentication Protocol-1 
In the case of {𝑃𝑗
′, 𝑃𝑗}∆𝑀𝐸𝑗, the intruder 𝑍(𝐶𝑖) can replay a few messages in re-authentication 
protocol-1; however, it fails to complete the protocol run and the presence of the intruder is thus 
detected after a few messages are exchanged. 
 
Figure 8.  An example of replay attack on TAP re-authentication protocol-1. 
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 𝑀1′: The intruder replays the message to deceive 𝑃𝑗
′ with a message seemingly sent by 
𝐶𝑖 and encrypted with 𝐾𝑠
𝑖.  
 𝑀3′: The intruder fails to complete the attack, as the expected reply is 𝐸𝑠
𝑖(𝐶𝑖||𝑁1
′ + 1), 
and 𝑃𝑗
′ notifies 𝑀𝐸𝑗 of the existence of an intruder. 
 
c) Replay attack in Re-Authentication Protocol-2 
In the case of {Z(𝐶𝑖),  𝐶𝑖}∆𝑀𝐸𝑗 , the attack follows a message sequence similar to that of the 
initial authentication case and provides the same conclusion; at M3, 𝑀𝐸𝑗 detects the threat, and 
at M5 the corresponding 𝑃𝑗 identifies the intruder. However, if  {𝐶𝑖}∆𝑀𝐸𝑗 and Z(𝐶𝑖)∆𝑀𝐸𝑘 such 
that {𝑀𝐸𝑗 ,  𝑀𝐸𝑘} ∈ 𝐺𝑗, meaning that the intruder intercepts the messages and uses it to become 
authenticated by another 𝑀𝐸𝑗  by exploiting the fact that the 𝑀𝐸𝑗𝑠 do not interact throughout the 
procedure. This attack is carried out as follows: 
 
Figure 9.  An example of replay attack on TAP re-authentication protocol-2. 
 𝑀1′: The intruder replays the message to deceive 𝑃𝑗
′ with a message seemingly sent by 
𝐶𝑖 and encrypted with 𝐾𝑠
𝑖. 
 𝑀3/𝑀3′: 𝑀𝐸𝑗or 𝑀𝐸𝑘 cannot detect an intruder. 
 𝑀5′: The intruder fails to complete the attack, as the expected reply is 𝐸𝑠
𝑖(𝐶𝑖||𝑁1
′ + 1), 
and 𝑃𝑗
′ notifies 𝑀𝐸𝑗 of the existence of an intruder 
D. TAP failure under given conditions 
Let’s Next, we consider a certain exceptional condition which enables an intruder to launch a 
successful attack.  
C1. 𝑍(𝐶𝑖) is in 𝑃𝑗 coverage area. 
C2. 𝐶𝑖 is not in the range of any legitimate 𝑃𝑗. 
C3. 𝑍(𝑃𝑗) can communicate with 𝐶𝑖 pretending to be a legitimate service provider. 
C4. 𝑍(𝐶𝑖) and 𝑍(𝑃𝑗)  can communicate directly with negligible time delay. 
C5. All four conditions should hold together. 
Under the given conditions, the intruder can act as a ‘man in middle’, replay messages, and run a 
parallel session of the protocol with ‘binding attack’ abilities. The intruder replays the message 
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which it receives from its partner, who runs a parallel session with a legitimate counterpart. 
However, even under the given conditions, the intruder cannot re-authenticate. The attack on the 
initial authentication will proceed as follows: 
 
Figure 10.  An example of a successful attack on TAP under given conditions.  
E. Remarks on TAP security 
In TAP, if a legitimate counter entity is an active participant in the system, the impersonating 𝐶𝑖 
or 𝑃𝑗 is detectable and identifiable; this implies that replay, binding, and parallel session attacks 
are not successful attacks against TAP. However, under highly exceptional conditions, a man in 
the middle, who can replay the messages and run a parallel session of the protocol with the 
capability of a binding attack, can launch a successful attack. In a system where these conditions 
are likely to occur, it is recommended to take certain measures to authenticate the identity of the 
broadcasting service provider entity (𝑃𝑗). To prevent DDoS attacks, the group join and initial 
authentication procedures include a puzzle in M1 and proceed if the requesting entity provides a 
valid solution [18,19]. 
VII. Formal analysis of TAP using CSP and RANK function analysis 
Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) refer a form of algebra which describes and 
analyzes a system which consists of communicating processes [20]. TAP authentication 
procedures can be defined as events of CSP processes, and through the rank function analysis 
method [21-23], we can verify the security of TAP. 
 
CSP Notations: 
• 𝐴 → 𝑃: Process 𝑃 performs an event 𝐴 on its interface.  After performing event 𝐴 process 
𝑃 may or may not change its state. 
• 𝑃⧠𝑄: 𝑃 Choice 𝑄 is a choice operator, it provides a process who behaves as 𝑃 or 𝑄. 
• 𝑃|𝑅|𝑄: 𝑃 and 𝑄 run in parallel and synchronized on event 𝑃. 
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of International Journal of 
Communication Systems, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final 
publication. Citation information: Preprint: arXiv:1702.04055[cs.CR] DOI: 10.1002/dac.3309 
– 𝑃|𝑅|𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃: Restrict process 𝑃 on event set 𝑅. 
• 𝑃 |||𝑄: 𝑃  and 𝑄  are the interleaving processes, and run in parallel without event 
synchronization. It is a special case of the parallel process, where an event set of 
synchronization is an empty set.  
– 𝑃 |||𝑄 = 𝑃|<>|𝑄. 
• 𝑆 ⊢ 𝑚: Set of messages 𝑆 can generate message 𝑚. 
• 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑠(𝑃): All possible event traces of process 𝑃. 
– 𝑡𝑟 ∈ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑠(𝑃): A trace sequence 𝑡𝑟 belongs to 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑠(𝑃) if 𝑃 performs events 
of 𝑡𝑟 in the same sequence. 
• 𝑡𝑟 ⇓ 𝐶: The set of messages in trace sequence 𝑡𝑟 collected at channel 𝐶. 
• 𝑡𝑟⨡𝐴: Maximal subsequence of trace sequence 𝑡𝑟 who's elements are taken from event set 
𝐴. 
• 𝑃 𝑠𝑎𝑡 𝑆 ⟺ 𝑡𝑟 ∈ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑠(𝑃) ∘ 𝑆. 
– If the trace 𝑡𝑟 is one of the traces of process 𝑃 such that trace 𝑡𝑟 predicated by the 
event/message 𝑆, implies that process 𝑃 satisfies the event/message set 𝑆. Such 
statement is trace specification (TS). 
• 𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑑: Set of id’s of all 𝐶𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗. 
• 𝑛 ≈ 𝑚: n is sufficient information to trust that m is correct/true information. 
 
 
A. Modeling the TAP network in CSP  
We consider the system 𝑁𝐸𝑇 , which is defined by the legitimate user processes of TAP in 
conjunction with the intruder process 𝑍. 
𝑁𝐸𝑇 = (𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐶
𝑖(𝑁0) |||𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑃
𝑗  |||𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑀𝐸
𝑗 ) |[𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑, 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒]|𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑍(𝑆) 
Where, 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐶
𝑖(𝑁0),  𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑃
𝑗
 and 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑀𝐸
𝑗
represent the legitimate interleaving processes of 𝐶𝑖,  𝑃𝑗 
and 𝑀𝐸𝑗, respectively, which are running in parallel and which are synchronized to intruder 𝑍 at 
the [𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑,  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒] event set. This gives the intruder the capabilities discussed below.   
a) Modeling Intruder 𝒁 in CSP 
Let us define a CSP model for intruder process 𝑍 as discussed in an earlier study [17] with 
certain extra capabilities. The intruder is capable of controlling all communication channels 
(send and receive) and can redirect, spoof, replay or block messages. It also has the initially 
known information 𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇, e.g., the IDs of all users. When a legitimate user sends a message to 
another legitimate user, 𝑍 can intercept and record each message; these intercepted messages are 
additional information with regard to the current information (𝑆) of 𝑍 i-e 𝑆 ∪ {𝑚}.  
 
 
 
Let us also suppose the existence of legitimate users 𝐴 and 𝐵. Intruder 𝑍  can deceive 𝐴 by 
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑧(𝑆) =    𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑.  𝐴. 𝐵. 𝑚 → 𝑍(𝑆 ∪ {𝑚}) 
                                               ⧠𝑆⊢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒 . 𝐴. 𝐵. 𝑚 → 𝑍(𝑆) 
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sending a message 𝑚 , intercepted or generated from current information 𝑆  (  𝑆 ⊢ 𝑚  ), and 
pretending to be user 𝐵. 
 
b) Modeling TAP Authentication Procedures in CSP 
The activities of 𝐶𝑖,  𝑃𝑗  and 𝑀𝐸𝑗  in TAP can be defined as CSP processes. In addition to the 
activation of TAP authentication, the CSP processes also generate two signals, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓 and 𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ: 
 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓. 𝐴. 𝐵. 𝑛 ≈ 𝑚 : Based upon information n, participant A is confident that shared 
information m is trusted information between A and B. 
 𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ. 𝐵. 𝐴. 𝑚: B authenticates A based upon trusted information m and B agrees that A 
was previously running the protocol and performed the corresponding signal 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓. 
The CSP processes for the TAP initial authentication protocol: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CSP processes for TAP re-authentication protocol-1: 
 
 
 
 
The CSP processes for TAP re-authentication protocol-2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where the activities of 𝑀𝐸𝑗  are common for all of the TAP protocols. 
 
B. Rank Function Analysis 
To prove the overall security of TAP, we use a proof strategy which verifies that all 
authentication protocols satisfy the rank theorem, which implies that TAP is a secure protocol. 
The entire process is discussed in detail in subsequent sub-sections. 
a) Proof strategy 
According to the protocol semantics, the signal 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓. 𝐴. 𝑏. 𝑚 must follow a signal 𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ. 𝐴. 𝐵. 𝑚, 
which implies the following authentication property (AP1): 
𝑁𝐸𝑇 𝑆𝑎𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓. 𝐶𝑖. 𝑃𝑗 . (𝑁0 ≈ 𝑁1) 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ. 𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖𝑁1 
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐶
𝑖 = ⧠𝑃
𝑗
  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒 . 𝐶𝑖 .  𝑃𝑗 . 𝐾𝑀𝐸
𝑗
→ 
                      𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝐶𝑖 .  𝑃𝑗 . 𝐸𝑀𝐸
𝑗
 (𝐶𝑖||𝑁0) → 
                      𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝑃𝑗 . 𝑢0 → 
                      𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓. 𝐶𝑖 . 𝑃𝑗 . 𝑁0 ≈ 𝑁1 → 
                      𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝐶𝑖 .  𝑃𝑗 . 𝐸𝑠
𝑖  (𝐶𝑖||𝑁1 + 1) →  𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃 
                       
 
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑃
𝑗
= 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑.  𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝐾𝑀𝐸
𝑗
→ 
                𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒.  𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝐸𝑀𝐸
𝑗
 (𝐶𝑖||𝑁0) → 
               𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑 . 𝑃𝑗 . 𝑀𝐸𝑗 . 𝐸𝑀𝐸
𝑗
 (𝐶𝑖||𝑁0) →   
               𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒 . 𝑀𝐸𝑗 . 𝑃𝑗 . 𝑢0 → 
               𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝑢0 → 
               𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒. 𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝐸𝑠
𝑖  (𝐶𝑖||𝑁1 + 1) → 
               𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ.  𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝑁1 → 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃 
         𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝑀𝐸𝑗. 𝑃𝑗 . 𝑢0||𝐸𝐺
𝑗(𝑉𝑖 ||𝑁1  ||𝑇𝑘) → 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃 
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑀𝐸
𝑗 =    𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒 . 𝑀𝐸𝑗 . 𝑃𝑗. (𝐶𝑖||𝑁0) → 
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐶
𝑖 = ⧠𝑃
𝑗
 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝐶𝑖 .  𝑃𝑗 . 𝐸𝑠
𝑖  (𝐶𝑖||𝑁0)||𝑇𝑘 → 
                     𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝑃𝑗 . 𝐸𝑠
𝑖(𝑃𝑗 ||𝑁1 ||𝑁0 + 1) → 
                    𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓. 𝐶𝑖 . 𝑃𝑗 . 𝑁0 ≈ 𝑁1 → 
                    𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝐶𝑖 .  𝑃𝑗 . 𝐸𝑠
𝑖  (𝐶𝑖||𝑁1 + 1) →  𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃  
                     
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑃
𝑗
= 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒.  𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝐸𝑠
𝑖  (𝐶𝑖||𝑁0)||𝑇𝑘 → 
               𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝐸𝑠
𝑖(𝑃𝑗 ||𝑁1 ||𝑁0 + 1) → 
               𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒. 𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝐸𝑠
𝑖  (𝐶𝑖||𝑁1 + 1) → 
               𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ.  𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝑁1 → 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃 
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐶
𝑖 = ⧠𝑃
𝑗
  𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝐶𝑖 .  𝑃𝑗 . 𝐸𝑠
𝑖  (𝐶𝑖||𝑁0)||𝑇𝑘||ℎ(𝑀𝐸𝑖) → 
                      𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝑃𝑗 . 𝑢0 → 
                      𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓. 𝐶𝑖 . 𝑃𝑗 . 𝑁0 ≈ 𝑁1 → 
                     𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝐶𝑖 .  𝑃𝑗 . 𝐸𝑠
𝑖  (𝐶𝑖||𝑁1 + 1) →  𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃  
                       
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑃
𝑗
=  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒.  𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝐸𝑠
𝑖  (𝐶𝑖||𝑁0)||𝑇𝑘||ℎ(𝑀𝐸𝑖) → 
               𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑 . 𝑃𝑗 . 𝑀𝐸𝑗 . 𝐸𝑠
𝑖  (𝐶𝑖||𝑁0)||𝑇𝑘||ℎ(𝑀𝐸𝑖) →   
                𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒 . 𝑀𝐸𝑗 . 𝑃𝑗 . 𝑢0 → 
                𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝑢0 → 
                𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒. 𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝐸𝑠
𝑖  (𝐶𝑖||𝑁1 + 1) → 
                 𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ.  𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝑁1 → 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃 
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To prove that 𝑁𝐸𝑇 should meet AP1, Schneider [22] specifies a simple strategy: for 𝑁𝐸𝑇 to 
satisfy AP1, 𝑁𝐸𝑇 must establish that 𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ. 𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖𝑁1  cannot be generated in 𝑁𝐸𝑇 if an 
occurrence of 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓. 𝐶𝑖. 𝑃𝑗 . 𝑁0 ≈ 𝑁1 is prevented. This proof strategy implies the following trace 
specification (TS1): 
𝑁𝐸𝑇 |𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓. 𝐶𝑖. 𝑃𝑗 . 𝑁1|𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃 𝑆𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑟⨡𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ. 𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖𝑁1 =<  > 
b) Rank Function 
Rank function (𝜌 : 𝑀 → 𝑁𝑢𝑚 ) maps the messages to a number, where 𝑀 is the set of all 
messages and signal generated messages (𝑆 ⊢ 𝑚) appearing in the protocol run. 𝜌(𝑚) > 0 if the 
disclosure of 𝑚 is safe (i.e., if 𝑁𝐸𝑇 maintains a secure state) and 𝜌(𝑚) ≤ 0 if the disclosure of 
𝑚 is unsafe (i.e., if 𝑁𝐸𝑇 enters a compromising state). For a process 𝑃 to maintain a positive 𝜌, it 
should not transmit 𝜌(𝑚) ≤ 0 until and unless 𝑃 has already received (𝑚) ≤ 0 . Such a process 
maintains the following trace specification (TS2). 
𝑃 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝜌 ⇔  ∀ 𝑡𝑟 ∈ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝑃) ∘ 𝜌(𝑡𝑟 ⇓ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒) > 0 ⇒ 𝜌(𝑡𝑟 ⇓ 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑) > 0 
If a process maintains TS2, it never introduces 𝜌(𝑚) ≤ 0; hence, a protocol is proved to be 
secure if all processes maintain TS2. 
c) Rank Theorem and Sufficient Condition 
Rank Theorem:  
If, for event sets 𝑅 and 𝑇, 𝜌 satisfying  
P1) ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇 ∘  𝜌(𝑚) > 0 
P2) ∀𝑆 ⊆ 𝑀,  𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 ∘ (∀𝑚′ ∈ 𝑆 ∘ 𝜌(𝑚′) > 0)⋀𝑆 ⊢ 𝑚 ⇒ 𝜌(𝑚) > 0 
P3) ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝜌(𝑡) ≤ 0 
P4) (𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖|𝑅|𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑠𝑎𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝜌) for each user 𝑖  
then, 𝑁𝐸𝑇 𝑠𝑎𝑡 𝑅 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑇. 
The proof of theorem is presented in earlier work [20]. The four properties of the rank function 
prevent an exchange of non-positive messages in the system 𝑁𝐸𝑇|𝑅|𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃 , which is 
synchronized with 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃 upon event set 𝑅. In TAP, 𝑅 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓. 𝐴. 𝐵. 𝑚 and 𝑇 = 𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ. 𝐴. 𝐵. 𝑚, 
which implies that the occurrence of signal 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓 will stop the process 𝑁𝐸𝑇. 
Earlier, we discussed with regard to the proof strategy that TAP is secure if it satisfies TS1. If the 
rank function of TAP holds all properties of the rank theorem, this implies that all of the 
processes maintain TS2, and 𝑁𝐸𝑇 satisfies TS1. This condition is sufficient to prove that TAP is 
a secure authentication protocol. 
d) Rank Analysis for TAP initial Authentication 
 Here, we define the rank function for the initial authentication. As discussed earlier, if an 
intruder impersonates 𝐶𝑖 or 𝑃𝑗, the system 𝑁𝐸𝑇 maintains a secure state; hence, 𝜌(𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑑) > 0. All 
nonce instances are non-positive such that 𝜌(𝑁) ≤ 0 ; hence, the nonce must be sent out 
encrypted with a secure key (𝐾 represents the set of all secure keys); i.e., 𝜌(𝐸𝑘(𝑁)) > 0. As 
described in TS1, 𝑁𝐸𝑇  is restricted upon 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓. 𝐴. 𝐵. 𝑚, and any message or signal after the 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓 signal is marked as non-positive. 
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of International Journal of 
Communication Systems, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final 
publication. Citation information: Preprint: arXiv:1702.04055[cs.CR] DOI: 10.1002/dac.3309 
 
 
  
 
 
 
At this stage, we can verify the security of the TAP initial authentication using the rank theorem 
properties.  
P1) ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇 ∘  𝜌(𝑚) > 0: The fundamental knowledge of the intruder 𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇 includes 𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑑 
and 𝐾𝑀𝐸
𝑗 ,  which have positive rank values, hence satisfying P1. 
P2) ∀𝑆 ⊆ 𝑀,  𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 ∘ (∀𝑚′ ∈ 𝑆 ∘ 𝜌(𝑚′) > 0)⋀𝑆 ⊢ 𝑚 ⇒ 𝜌(𝑚) > 0 : This property verifies 
whether a set of positive rank messages can generate a non-positive rank message. All non-
positive rank messages are encrypted with the non-positive encryption key 𝐾𝑠
𝑖 . The intruder 
cannot acquire 𝐾𝑠
𝑖 without knowing the non-positive key 𝐾𝑐
𝑖, the non-positive nonce 𝑁0, and the 
non-positive nonce 𝑁1; hence, this condition satisfies P2. 
P3) ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝜌(𝑡) ≤ 0: The event set 𝑇 is the 𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ. 𝐴. 𝐵. 𝑚 signal, and under the given restriction 
we have 𝜌(𝐴𝑡ℎ𝑢. 𝐴. 𝐵. 𝑚) ≤ 0, hence satisfying P3. 
P4) (𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖|𝑅|𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑠𝑎𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝜌) for each user 
This property states that all users 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑑 should maintain a positive state when restricted with 
regard to event set 𝑅 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓. 𝐴. 𝐵. 𝑚. We confirm if the processes 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐶
𝑖  and 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑃
𝑗
 satisfy P4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hence, the protocol maintains a positive 𝜌 under the given restriction, and it satisfies P4.  
It is concluded that the TAP initial authentication protocol is secure, and we further check re-
authentication protocol-1 and protocol-2. 
e) Rank Analysis for TAP Re-Authentication 
Rank function for TAP re-authentication protocols 1 and 2 are similar to the rank function for 
initial authentication (because all the conventions of initial authentication hold true for re-
authentication protocol 1 and 2), except ticket, which is encrypted with non-positive keys, hence 
we have 𝜌(𝑇𝑘) >0. From CSP of TAP re-authentication, we notice that message and signal 
pattern after 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓. 𝐴. 𝑏. 𝑚 is similar to the initial authentication protocol. Hence, TAP satisfies 
the rank properties for re-authentication protocol 1 and 2 as well. It concludes that TAP is a 
secure authentication protocol. 
𝜌(𝐸𝑘(𝑁)) > 0 
𝜌(𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑑) > 0   
𝜌(𝐴𝑡ℎ𝑢) ≤ 0  
𝜌(𝑁) ≤ 0  
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐶
𝑖|𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓. 𝐶. 𝑃. 𝑁1|𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃 =  ⧠𝑃
𝑗
   𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒 . 𝐶𝑖 .  𝑃𝑗 . 𝑘𝑀𝐸
𝑗
→ 
                                                            𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝐶𝑖 .  𝑃𝑗 . 𝐸𝑀𝐸
𝑗
 (𝐶𝑖||𝑁0) → 
                                                            𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝑃𝑗 . 𝑢0 → 
                                                            𝑖𝑓 𝑃 = 𝑃𝑗 ∧ 𝑁 = 𝑁0 ≈ 𝑁1 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃 
                                                            𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓𝑃 = 𝑃𝑗 ∧ 𝑁 ≠ 𝑁0 
                                                           𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒  
𝜌(𝑚)  = {
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑚 = 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒. 𝑃𝑗 . 𝐶𝑖 . 𝐸𝑠
𝑖(𝐶_𝑖||𝑁1 + 1)𝑂𝑟
𝑚 = 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝐶𝑖 . 𝑃𝑗 . 𝐸𝑠
𝑖(𝐶𝑖||𝑁1 + 1)
1      𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                        
 
𝜌(𝐾)  = {
1  𝑖𝑓 𝐾 = 𝐾𝑀𝐸
𝑗
0    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
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VIII. Security and Performance 
Comparison  
A. Security Comparison 
 
In this section, we compare TAP with existing 
authentication schemes [24-27]. The TAP protocol 
is not limited to a particular network type or 
application scenario; thus, we compare TAP with a 
sensor network [24-25], LTE [26] and client-server 
applications [27]. In the previous sections, we 
examined the strength of TAP with a rigorous 
analysis. For further confirmation of the strength 
of the TAP protocol, we implemented TAP and 
several well-known previously proposed schemes 
[24-27] in an automated security protocol analysis 
tool, Scyther [28]. The Scyther tool verifies 
protocol claims against possible attacks in the 
presence of an intruder, as discussed in Section V-
B. The claims are events which describe the aim 
and security properties of the authentication 
protocol, as defined below [1-2].  
Aliveness: This claim infers that at the end of a 
protocol run, the participants are guaranteed that 
all participants were running the protocol. Weak 
Agreement: This claim presumes that at the end of 
the protocol run, protocol initiator is confident that 
the protocol responder has been running the 
protocol, though superficially. Non-injective 
Agreement: This claim infers that at the end of a 
protocol run, the protocol initiator is confident that 
the protocol responder has been running the 
T
A
B
L
E
 I
I 
A
U
T
H
E
N
T
IC
A
T
IO
N
 P
R
O
P
E
R
T
IE
S
 C
O
M
P
A
R
IS
O
N
 
C
la
im
s 
B
. 
V
ai
y
d
a 
et
. 
al
 [
2
4
] 
I.
 C
h
an
g
 e
t.
 a
l 
[2
5
] 
L
i 
X
ie
h
u
a 
[2
6
] 
H
. 
L
in
 e
t.
 a
l 
[2
7
] 
T
A
P
  
T
A
P
  
N
o
t 
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
 
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
 
N
o
t 
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
 
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
 
N
o
t 
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
 
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
 
N
o
t 
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
 
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
 
N
o
t 
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
 
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
 
U
 
G
W
 
S
 
U
 
G
W
 
S
 
U
 
G
W
 
S
 
U
 
G
W
 
S
 
U
E
 
M
M
E
 
H
S
S
 
U
E
 
M
M
E
 
H
S
S
 
U
 
S
 
U
 
S
 
C
 
P
 
M
E
 
C
 
P
 
M
E
 
A
li
v
en
es
s 
N
 
Y
 
N
 
N
 
Y
 
N
 
Y
 
Y
 
N
 
Y
 
Y
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
Y
 
N
 
N
 
Y
 
N
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
W
ea
k
 
A
g
re
em
en
t 
N
 
Y
 
N
 
N
 
Y
 
N
 
Y
 
Y
 
N
 
Y
 
Y
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
Y
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
N
o
n
-
in
je
ct
iv
e 
A
g
re
em
en
t 
N
 
Y
 
N
 
N
 
Y
 
N
 
Y
 
Y
 
N
 
Y
 
Y
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
Y
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
Y
 
N
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
N
o
n
-
in
je
ct
iv
e 
A
g
re
em
en
t 
N
 
Y
 
N
 
N
 
Y
 
N
 
Y
 
Y
 
N
 
Y
 
Y
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
Y
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
Y
 
N
 
N
 
N
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
 
TABLE I 
SCYTHER PARAMETER SETTINGS 
Parameter Type 
Number of Runs 1~100 
Matching Type Find all Type Flaws 
Search pruning Find All Attacks 
Number of pattern per claim 100 
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protocol according to a defined role and participants are agreed upon a data set shared during the 
protocol run. Non-injective Synchronization: This claim infers that at the end of a protocol run, 
all participants are confident that all other participants exactly followed their roles in the protocol 
and exchanged messages in the intended order.  
In Scyther the protocols are modeled as an exchange of messages among the participants 
performing specific ‘roles’; for instance, the customer node performs the role of the initiator, the 
service provider performs the role of the responder, and the ME performs the role of a server. 
We implemented and tested TAP and the proposed methods of Vaiyda et al. [24], Chang et al. 
[25], Xiehua [26], and Lin et al. [27] through the claims mentioned above with the parameter 
settings given in Table I. 
The protocols are tested under ‘Restricted’ and ‘Not Restricted’ conditions. Under the 
‘Restricted’ conditions, honest participants using the protocol are restricted and can thus run only 
one instance of the protocol. These results are shown in Table II. It is clear that our protocol 
qualifies all of the protocol claims, and no attacks were noted under the restricted condition. 
Conversely, it fails to fulfill a few claims when participants are permitted to run multiple 
instances. However, our protocol outperforms those in the earlier works [24-27], and it is secure 
in a large number of systems and scenarios. In contrast, the earlier methods [24-27] are 
susceptible to several attacks and fail to fulfill the majority of authentication claims. 
B. Performance Comparison 
 The results of the performance 
comparison are presented in Table 
III, where we compare the 
efficiency of the TAP 
authentication protocol suite in 
terms of the computational cost, 
message complexity and time 
synchronization requirements 
against the authentication schemes 
discussed above [24-27]. The 
computational cost is estimated to 
be the sum of the overall number of 
modular exponentiations (e) and the 
hash (h) and XOR (x) operations. 
To compute the computational cost 
of one of the earlier methods [26], 
we assumed that the cost of 
functions f3, f4, and s10 in the SE-EPS vector generation algorithm were identical to one hash 
operation. Regarding the computational cost, the TAP protocol suite greatly outperforms all of 
the schemes. Referring to the modular exponentiation, the approach presented by Lin et al. [27] 
is the most expensive scheme, followed by those of Chang et al. [25], Xiehua [26] and Vaiyda et 
TABLE III 
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF TAP WITH PREVIOUS WORK 
Scheme↓ 
Comp.  
Complexity 
Message  
Complexity 
Time  
Syn. 
B. Vaiyda 
et. al [24] 
8H+4X (6+k)U Y 
I. Chang 
et. al [25] 
25H+1X (2+5)U Y 
Li Xiehua 
[26] 
12H+2X 8U N 
H. Lin et. 
al [27] 
13H+12X+2
E 
(2+3)U Y 
TAP (IA) 3H 5U N 
TAP (RA-
1) 
1H 3U N 
TAP (RA-
2) 
4H 4U N 
E=Modular exponentiation,  𝐻 = hash operation, X=XOR 
operation, U = unicast message 
 
 
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of International Journal of 
Communication Systems, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final 
publication. Citation information: Preprint: arXiv:1702.04055[cs.CR] DOI: 10.1002/dac.3309 
al. [24]. For the sake of simplicity, we 
ignore the computational cost of the XOR 
operation. Figure 11 shows the 
computational cost of TAP compared to 
the approaches of Vaiyda et al. [24], 
Chang et al. [25] and Xiehua [26] for a 
mobile customer node moving across the 
network and experiencing the 
authentication process. Figure 12 shows 
the message complexity of TAP compared 
to these earlier schemes [24-27] for a 
mobile customer node moving across the 
network and experiencing the 
authentication process multiple times. The 
message complexity is presented for the 
method of Vaiyda et al. [24], calculated 
with the assumption that k=3, meaning 
that at the time of joining there are five 
potential nodes which can process the 
login request sent by a user. In the best-
case scenario, when a customer 
experiences re-authentication protocol 1 
the, TAP message complexity is the 
lowest. However, the message complexity 
of the approach by Lin et al. [27] is 
slightly better than the message 
complexity of TAP in the worst-case 
scenario. Moreover, unlike the methods of 
Vaiyda et al. [24], Chang et al. [25] and 
Lin et al. [27], TAP and the approach by 
Xiehua [26] do not require time 
synchronization among the participating entities.    
IX. Conclusion   
In this paper, we proposed a novel key distribution and authentication protocol (TAP) for 
dynamic and mobile network applications. TAP enhances the level of protocol security with the 
assistance of time-based encryption keys and scales down the authentication complexity by 
issuing an authentication ticket. A security analysis conducted here shows that TAP is secure 
against known attacks. A formal analysis using CSP and rank function analysis further confirms 
the strength of the TAP protocol. We also compared the security and performance of TAP with a 
  
Figure 11. Computational cost comparison of TAP 
with previous works.  
 
Figure 12. Message Complexity comparison of TAP 
with previous works. 
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sensor network [24-25], LTE [26] and with the Client Server Application approach [27]. The 
final results show that TAP is secure and desirable for an immense range of network 
applications.  
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